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INTRODUCTION
[The object of spurious interpretation is to make, unmake, or remake, and not merely
to discover. It puts a meaning into the text as a juggler puts coins, or what not, into a
dummy's hair, to be pulled forth presently with an air of discovery. It is essentially a
legislative, not a judicial process ....

In skewering the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v.
Mead Corp.,2 Justice Scalia's rhetoric is exceptional. He derides the decision as "one of the most significant opinions ever rendered by the Court
dealing with the judicial review of administrative action. Its consequences
will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad." 3 Although Justice Scalia
objects to Mead's new and uncertain limits on the applicability of the
Chevron doctrine,4 this Article will focus instead on how Mead employs a
* Dorothy Salmon Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D.
1984, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1978, Williams College. I wish to thank my colleague, John Rogers, for discussing the subject of this Article with me and for providing
very helpful comments on a previous draft. Any errors are my own.
1. Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation,7 COLUM. L. REv. 379, 382 (1907).

2. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
3. Id. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 239 ("Today's opinion makes an
avulsive change in judicial review of federal administrative action.").
4. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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method of interpretation imputing a clear intent to Congress, and authorizes
courts to discern statutory meaning without strong deference to an agency's
expert and political interpretation of the statute.
This Article begins by briefly describing the interpretive regime defined
by Chevron. That regime found in statutory ambiguity an implied delegation of lawmaking power to agencies. The Article then discusses how
Mead changes that default rule to one delegating principal interpretive
lawmaking power to courts in the absence of affirmative evidence of congressional intent to delegate that power to agencies. This shift resulted
from an interpretive method that spuriously imputed intent to Congress.
Although the Mead Court purported to accept the rule of deference dictated
by Congress, the Court itself was the source of the imputed intent. This
Article concludes by discussing how Mead's interpretive approach is similar to the approach in an important and growing line of Rehnquist Court
decisions loading the interpretive dice in favor of results not clearly intended by Congress, and thereby arrogates to the judiciary lawmaking
power better exercised by the legislature or the agency.
I.

CHEVRON'S INTERPRETIVE REGIME: AMBIGUITY AND IMPLIED
DELEGATION TO AGENCIES AS THE DEFAULT RULE

Judges identify and promote their political values when they adopt and
apply particular methods and canons of statutory interpretation. 5 MoreoIn Chevron, the Court established the following two-step analysis of the legality of an
agency's legal interpretation:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court
does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43 (citation omitted).
5. See CASS R. SuNSTErN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 168-69 (1996)
("People trying to choose an interpretive method must decide how to allocate power among
various groups and institutions-indeed, allocating power is what the choice of an interpretive method does."); see also id. at 174 ("[A] system of legal interpretation is inevitably a
function of decisions that are, broadly speaking, political in character.").
Selecting an interpretive methodology thus involves inevitable choices about the institutional allocation of power. If courts give strong deference to agencies' interpretations of the statutes they administer, that arrangement shifts law elaboration authority away from judges and toward the executive. If courts reject the authority of
legislative history, they shift power away from committees and bill sponsors and to-

2002]

MEAD AND THE SHRINKING DOMAIN

ver, the consistent use of canons of construction should enable all actors in
the process of lawmaking-legislatures, agencies, and courts-to adjust

their conduct in ways making the law more transparent, determinate, and
predictable. 6
The canon of construction identified in Chevron7 has played a critical
role in defining the relative roles of legislature, agency, and court in developing the content of public law. The canon clearly recognizes the primacy
of the legislature by holding "unambiguously expressed" congressional intent determines the content of law and "must be given effect."8 When a
statute is ambiguous, however, Chevron located lawmaking primacy in the
agency, whose interpretation of law must be upheld by a court unless it is
unreasonable. 9
The default rule of Chevron, therefore, is that Congress delegated to the
agency the authority to resolve any statutory ambiguity because, relative to
the court, the agency is in a preferred position to make the unresolved policy decision.' 0 This default rule applies regardless of whether the delegaward agencies and courts. If courts start from an assumption of strong legislative supremacy in statutory cases, they define themselves as subordinates of the legislature.
John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. Cmu. L. REv.
685, 691-92 (1999) (citation omitted).
6. Professor Eskridge argued consistent application of the canons of construction:
[M]ight constitute an interpretive regime that both restrains judges and enables the
citizenry to predict how those judges will apply ambiguous as well as clear statutes.
Not least important, such an interpretive regime could serve democracy values ... as
legislators and their staffs could predict how different proposed statutory language
would be applied.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation,66 U.

C. L. Rnv. 671,679 (1999) (footnote omitted). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. Rav. 26, 86 (1994) ("[Clanons
are designed, as we believe and the Court maintains they are, to create a predictable interpretive regime .... ).
7. This canon is presented supra note 4.
8. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
9. Decisions rejecting agency interpretations under the second part of the Chevron
analysis are quite rare. The Court, however, recently held an agency acted unreasonably in
construing an ambiguous statute. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 484
(2001) ("Me statute is in our view ambiguous concerning the manner in which Subpart I
and Subpart 2 interact with regard to revised ozone standards, and we would defer to the
EPA's reasonable resolution of that ambiguity. We cannot defer, however, to the interpretation the EPA has given.") (citations omitted).
10. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 861 (2001) (citations omitted), where the authors stated:
One reason for preferring agency interpretations, which is alluded to by Chevron itself, is that agencies are more politically accountable than are courts. Choosing
between two or more permissible interpretations of a statute is a political act, involving the exercise of discretion in channeling the coercive powers of the state in one di-
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tion to the agency was express or implied, intended or unintended:" the
delegation is a consequence of the statute's ambiguity. Chevron's assign-

ment of lawmaking power was based on the Court's view that the agency is
appropriately responsive to political judgment and Congress would be as-

sumed to have intended agency decision making, rather than judicial decision making, when 2implementation of a statute necessitated a determinate

statutory meaning.'

rection rather than another. A robust deference doctrine therefore helps minimize the
occasions in which courts are tempted to employ statutory interpretation to impose
their policy preferences on a public to which they are not accountable.

Id.
11. The Court made this point explicitly in Chevron, when it stated:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In
such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
467 U.S. at 843-44 (footnotes omitted). The Court further stated:
Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this
level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did
not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a
coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their
chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not
which of these things occurred.
Id. at 865.
12. See id. at 865-66 (citation omitted), where the Court stated:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of
the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests,
but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency
to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits
of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise
policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch
of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether
it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.
In such a case, federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the
wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views
of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
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In sum, Chevron's interpretive regime defined a background rule yielding agencies significant lawmaking power in the absence of unambiguously

expressed legislative intent.
II. MEAD AND THE IMPUTATION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT:
SCOPE FOR CHEVRON DEFERENCE

A NARROWED

The Court's decision in Mead redefines the default rule for determining
when the Chevron interpretive regime will apply."3 The redefinition is accomplished by the Court's imputation of legislative intent. The Court concludes statutory silence regarding delegation to the agency of implied decision making authority means Congress intended an agency is not to be
accorded Chevron deference in its interpretive decisions. Chevron, of
course, indicated the same rule of deference should apply regardless of
whether the delegation is express or implied.' 4 Indeed, in accounting for
Chevron's significance, commentators focused on how Chevron worked a
"fundamental" shift in administrative law by eliminating the distinction in
degrees of deference drawn in earlier U.S. Supreme Court decisions between exercises of expressly or impliedly delegated authority. 5
Id. (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
13. The limits on the scope of Chevron deference newly defined by Mead were not
wholly surprising given the Court's decision the previous term in, Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). There, the Court indicated that the scope of Chevron's applicability was uncertain, but failed to identify a rationale for the inapplicability of Chevron,
relying instead on ipse dixit to reject the agency's request for deference:
[W]e confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after,
for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of
Instead, interpretations contained
law---do not warrant Chevron-style deference ....
in formats such as opinion letters are "entitled to respect" under our decision in Skidmore, but only to the extent that those interpretations have the "power to persuade."
Id. at 587 (citations omitted). Only Justice Souter, the author of the Court's opinion in
Mead appeared to foretell Mead's analytic approach. Justice Souter concurred in Christensen, stating Chevron deference would have followed if the agency's decision had been
adopted through informal rulemaking. See id. at 589. In that form, the agency decision
would have met both of the Mead requirements that are identified and discussed infra.
14. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
15. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 10, at 833-34 (footnotes omitted), in which the
authors stated:
Chevron expanded the sphere of mandatory deference through one simple shift
in doctrine: It posited that courts have a duty to defer to reasonable agency interpretations not only when Congress expressly delegates interpretative authority to an
agency, but also when Congress is silent or leaves ambiguity in a statute that an
agency is charged with administering. The Court in Chevron blandly referred to such
gaps and ambiguities as "implied" delegations of interpretative authority and treated
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Justice David Souter's decision in Mead twice alludes to the distinction
in types of delegations the legal significance of which were eliminated by
Chevron and thereby indicates full, Chevron-type deference will continue
to apply in any case of an express delegation. He first signals this result
when he offers a narrowed restatement of the rule of Chevron deference,
focusing on express delegations:
When Congress has "explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation," and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless procedurally
I
defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.

Justice Souter provides a second indication when he presents his argument regarding the background expectation of congressional intent about7
judicial deference, which focuses only on instances of implied delegation.1

It is in these cases of implied delegation that the Mead Court limits the
applicability of Chevron deference. Such deference will be accorded to
agency decisions only when a court concludes that Congress "expect[ed]"
Chevron-type deference based on "statutory circumstances:"
[l1t can still be apparent from the agency's generally conferred authority and other
statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak
with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the
enacted law, even one about which "Congress did not actually have an intent" as to a
particular result. When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency's exercise of its generally conferred
authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency's chothese implied delegations as equivalent to express delegations. Chevron's equation of
gaps and ambiguities with express delegations turned the doctrine of mandatory deference, formerly an isolated pocket of administrative law doctrine, into a ubiquitous
formula governing court-agency relations. With this one small doctrinal shift, the
Court effected a fundamental transformation in the relationship between courts and
agencies under administrative law.
See also Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative InterpretationsofLaw, 1989
DuKE L.J. 511, 512, 516 (reaching similar conclusion about Chevron's change in the law of
deference).
16. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (citations and footnote
omitted).
17. See id. at 229 (citations omitted), where the Court states:
This Court in Chevron recognized that Congress not only engages in express delegation of specific interpretive authority, but that "[s]ometimes the legislative delegation
to an agency on a particular question is implicit." Congress, that is, may not have expressly delegated authority or responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill
a particular gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the agency's generally conferred
authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to
be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or
fills a space in the enacted law, even one about which "Congress did not actually
have an intent" as to a particular result.
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sen resolution seems unwise, but is obliged to accept the agency's position if Congress has not
18 previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency's interpretation is
reasonable.

This reading of congressional intent is actually more elaborate than it
might appear, because the Court's reference to "an agency's exercise of its
generally conferred authority" carries a particular meaning. This meaning,
expressed in the Court's statement of its holding, implicates the procedures
employed by the agency in reaching the decision at issue. In the Court's
view, Congress should be understood to have intended Chevron review in
instances of an implied delegation only when the agency has been delegated relevant decision making authority and reached its decision through a
decision making process giving the decision procedural legitimacy.' 9
The interpretive default rule defined by Mead is striking in two respects.
First, the Court's position that it is simply and properly following the intent
of the legislature rings hollow: on its face, the imputation of intent is too
far-reaching and the interpretive result is spurious.20 Can we reasonably
believe Congress intended varied levels of deference should be accorded to
administrative decisions on the basis of the indeterminate, inconsistent, and
ambiguous factors weighed by the Court in deciding Congress did not intend to accord Chevron deference to the Customs Service in its customs
rulings? The factors considered by the Court range from delegation of
rulemaking authority, to the regime of judicial review of the Customs

18. Id. (citations omitted).
19. The Court's holding was as follows:
We hold that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power
to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.
Id. at 226-27.
20. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS INTHE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1194-95 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994), where the authors stated that:
The principle of institutional settlement, , . . obviously, forbids a court to substitute its own ideas for what the legislature has duly enacted. What the legislature
has thus enacted should not be frustrated or defeated. What it has not thus enacted
should be declared to be law, if at all, only upon the court's independent responsibility and not upon a pretense of legislative responsibility.
Id. See also Frank E. Horack Jr., The Disintegrationof Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J.
335, 345 (1949) ("Numerous other rules of presumption (in statutory construction] serve the
function of shifting policy determination from the legislature to the court.").
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Service's classifications, to the agency's practice in issuing its classifica-

tions, to the number of such classifications. 2'

Second, the Mead rule fundamentally shifts the default rule from one in
which congressional silence related to an implied delegation yielded Chev-

ron deference to the agency to one in which congressional silence results in
a delegation of lawmaking primacy to the courts, which are to give an
agency interpretation only as much deference as it has power to persuade
the court. At least two flaws of this redefined presumption of nondelegation to agencies are apparent. First, by establishing a new background rule
for understanding legislative action, Mead shifted the context for under-

standing congressional action. The retroactive application of this new interpretive regime to statutes enacted prior to the Court's decision in Mead
can only be understood to unsettle the expectations of the legislature, assuming that they understand the background presumptions at all.22

More significantly, Mead is flawed because its presumptive implied
delegation of interpretive authority to courts rather than agencies will mean
statutory law will be more often decided by courts than by democratically
responsive decision makers. When applicable, broad Chevron deference is,

21. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 232-34. Justice Scalia argued it was the difficulty of making
just this sort of conclusion about legislative intent regarding implied delegations to agencies
that led to the broad application of the Chevron standard in the first place. See Scalia, supra
note 15, at 516 ("Chevron, however, if it is to be believed, replaced this statute-by-statute
evaluation (which was assuredly a font of uncertainty and litigation) with an across-theboard presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant."). Two courts
applied this Mead test and, after considering the various factors suggestive of congressional
intent determined that Congress intended Chevron deference to apply. See Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., 254 F.3d 173, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding Chevron
deference is applicable to Federal Election Commission regulation of the National Rifle Association); Fontana v. Caldera, 160 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128 (D.DC. 2001) (holding Chevron
deference applies for decisions of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in interpreting its regulations and statutes).
22. The Court's shifting background rules for understanding the meaning of congressional action have led to Professors Eskridge and Frickey criticism of the Court's "bait and
switch" approach to statutory interpretation:
[Two recent] decisions surely came as a surprise to Congress. Indeed, there is a "bait
and switch" feature to [these] cases ... when Congress enacted the statutes in ques-

tion, the constitutionality of the state-infringing provisions was clear and Congress
could not have anticipated the Gregory rule; nor could a reasonable observer have
predicted the expansion of Gregory in [the second case]. When the Court's practice
induces Congress to behave in a certain way and the Court then switches the rules,
Congress justifiably feels taken.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 6, at 85 (footnote omitted). The Court's regime of Chevron
deference would have been understood by Congress to apply since 1984. The Court's
analysis in Mead included consideration of the intent of statutory amendments enacted in
1993. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 223, 234.
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of course, only triggered when Congress itself has not dictated a particular
statutory meaning. The problematic effect of Mead is that when a statute is
ambiguous and accordingly in need of interpretation to determine the content of law, the court rather than the more democratically responsive
agency will have ultimate decision making power. Justice Scalia argues,
moreover, that Mead's rule of deference will result in ossification of statutory law, because once a court exercising the primary lawmaking authority
recognized by Mead determines the meaning of a statute, that meaning can
be changed only by amendment of the statute.23 To the extent Justice
Souter's intent-based scope of Chevron doctrine applicability can avoid this
problem,2 4 the Court's attribution of congressional intent becomes even less
believable. It seems fanciful Congress would have intended different standards of judicial review would apply and the statute would have different
meanings, based on the procedures pursued by the agency at the time it defined its interpretation of the statute.25
In sum, the Court's interpretive turn in Mead can be seen only as spurious interpretation because the Court's analysis goes so far in imputing intent to Congress that the whole enterprise can only be seen as fictitious.
There was, to be sure, fiction in defining the default rule in Chevron; however, this imputation of intent accomplished by the Chevron doctrine is far
less objectionable for two reasons. First, the imputation of intent accepted
a delegation to agencies rather than to the courts for the primary authority
to resolve a statute's ambiguities. Chevron was accordingly not selfserving in its understanding of congressional intent. Second, the legal actor
to whom lawmaking authority is attributed by Chevron is the politically accountable decision maker, rather than the nonpolitically responsive
courts.2 6
23. See Mead, 533 U.S. 245-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. Recall Justice Souter was the only Justice in Christensen (see discussion supra note
13 and accompanying text) to express the opinion that the agency might be able to have a
court approve its interpretation of the statute if it proceeded by notice-and-comment rulemaking, rather than by an informal letter. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589
(2000) (Souter, J., concurring) ("I join the opinion of the Court on the assumption that it
does not foreclose a reading of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 that allows the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations limiting forced use.").
25. Cf Mead,533 U.S. at 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting), stating:
Is it likely-or indeed even plausible-that Congress meant, when such an agency
chooses rulemaking, to accord the administrators of that agency, and their successors,
the flexibility of interpreting the ambiguous statute now one way, and later another;
but, when such an agency chooses case-by-case administration, to eliminate all future
agency discretion by having that same ambiguity resolved authoritatively (and forever) by the courts?

Id.
26.

Cf Horack Jr., supra note 20, at 342-43, in which the author makes the following

ADMINISTRATIVE LA WREVIEW

[54:2

IlI. MEAD AND PRESUMPTIVE STATUTORY MEANING

In assessing the significance of Mead's imputation of legislative intent,
one should not understand the case as an exceptional effort to rein in the
scope of application of the Chevron doctrine. Rather, the case is yet another important example of the Rehnquist Court's unwillingness to conclude that a statute's meaning is ambiguous, due to the Court's own imputation of clear meaning or intent. Considered in this light, the case shows
that the Court is continuing a decisive move away from deference to
agency interpretations based on a spurious claim of yielding to clear statutory meaning or legislative intent.27
Two other decisions by the Court during its 2000 term provide important
examples of how the Court has come to restrain administrative discretion
by constraining the scope of statutory ambiguity through rules of presumption. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v.
comments about rules of presumptive meaning of statutes:
Rules of interpretation in the nature of presumptions . . . are fictional rules of interpretation and frequently lead to results exactly opposite those which legislatures intend. At best they are judicial standards requiring a particular form of legislative expression. As such, they are within limits defensible. Every system of government
depends upon the ability of society to require of its people certain formalities as prerequisite to legal consequence. It is not too much to require this of the agencies of
government as well. Formalities, however, become intolerable when they no longer
reflect the normal expectations of the society for which they were constructed.
27. Understood in this manner, Justice Scalia's cri de coeur regarding Mead's fundamental shift in administrative law, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, can only be understood as disingenuous. Because Justice Scalia typically concludes that a statute has a
clear meaning, relying when necessary on the imputation of statutory meaning, see infra
notes 36-40 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn's, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001)), he is less likely to reach the
second step of the Chevron analysis; the step at which strong deference is present. See supra note 8. This point has been well stated in a recent article:
Justice Scalia has taken the position that it is appropriate for courts to take policy
considerations into account as part of the ordinary tools of statutory construction deployed at step one. The upshot of this position is that Justice Scalia invokes Chevron
more consistently than other Justices, but also ends up deferring to agency views less
than other Justices. In Justice Scalia's hands, Chevron has the paradoxical result of
diluting, rather than strengthening, the practice of deference to executive understandings of law.
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 10, at 860 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, Justice Scalia made
much the same comment about his application of Chevron deference. See Scalia, supra note
15, at 521:

One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its
text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not
personally adopt.
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United States Army Corps of Engineers,28 the Supreme Court held, when it
enacted the Clean Water Act, 29 Congress did not delegate to the Corps of
Engineers the authority to regulate the filling of "other waters."30 The
Corps supported the legality of its view of the Act's jurisdictional scope by

its claim that the statute was ambiguous in defining its jurisdictional reach,
and that the Court, therefore, had to defer to the Corps' regulation under
Chevron.a" The Court held, however, that the meaning of the statute's text
was plainly contrary to the Corps' position, and even an ambiguous text
would not have resulted in deference on this question.32 The Court held the
Corps could not rely upon an inferential delegation of discretionary power
to the agency, but instead had to show clear statutory authority for its exercise of jurisdiction.33 For the Rehnquist Court, therefore, statutory ambi-

guity was no longer the sufficient basis for the Corps' assertion of regulatory authority that it had been in Riverside Bayview Homes. The Court's
28. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). See generally Michael P. Healy, Textualism's Limits on the
Administrative State: Of Isolated Waters, Barking Dogs, and Chevron, 31 Envtl. L. Inst.
10,928, 10,940 (2001) (arguing the SWANCC Court overturned a long-standing agency interpretation of a rule in direct defiance of the "spirit" of Chevron deference).
29. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
30. Corps of Engineers Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3) (2001).
31. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172. Indeed, the Court itself had found the definition of
"navigable waters" to be ambiguous in, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121 (1985), and deferred to the Corps' exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131.
32. The SWANCC Court accordingly assumed the applicability of Chevron and then
explained why, in its view, Chevron deference was unwarranted. Because the "Migratory
Bird Rule" was an interpretation of the statute that had not been adopted following noticeand-comment rulemaking the Court might have held that Chevron deference was inapplicable. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 163-64, 164 n.l .
33. The SWANCC Court stated:
These are significant constitutional questions raised by respondents' application
of their regulations, and yet we find nothing approaching a clear statement from Congress that it intended § 404(a) to reach an abandoned sand and gravel pit such as we
have here. Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the "Migratory Bird Rule" would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use. See, e.g.,
Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994),
("[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments"). Rather than expressing a desire to readjust the federal-state balance in this
manner, Congress chose to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States ...to plan the development and use... of land and water
resources.. . ." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). We thus read the statute as written to avoid the
significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents' interpretation, and therefore reject the request for administrative deference.
Id. at 174 (citation omitted).
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demand for a clear statement of regulatory authority in the Clean Water Act
is quite important because it responds to an agency request for Chevron
deference with a rule of construction shifting the burden to the agency to
come forward with an express delegation of authority from Congress to
support its jurisdiction, rather than mere ambiguity. 34 "The Court's use of
this clear statement rule allowed the Court to disregard strong evidence of
legislative intent and purpose supporting the exercise of jurisdiction over
'other waters' and to nullify the Corps' long-standing interpretation of the
[Clean Water Act]."'"
Another recent decision similarly limiting the scope of statutory ambiguity is Whitman v. American Trucking Ass 'ns, Inc.36 There, Justice Scalia,
writing for the court, concluded the Clean Air Act (CAA) barred the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from considering costs in defining the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS): "The text of § 109(b),
interpreted in its statutory and historical context and with appreciation for
its importance to the CAA as a whole, unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process, and thus ends the matter for us as
well as the EPA., 37 The Court's decision that the statute was unambiguous
followed from its application of a clear statement rule similar to the one
applied in SWANCC. The American Trucking Court initially stated, before
it would recognize that the statute authorized the EPA to consider costs in
defining the NAAQS, "respondents must show a textual commitment of
authority to the EPA to consider costs [and] that textual commitment must

34. In a recent article, I describe how this clear statement rule can be traced to two important, recent cases rejecting agency calls for Chevron deference. In both MCI Telecommunications Corp, v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994), and FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), "the Court employed a similar
clear statement rule requiring the expressly affirmative grant of regulatory authority to foreclose the Corps' exercise of nontraditional regulatory jurisdiction." Healy, supra note 28, at
10,935, 10,940.
35. Healy, supra note 28, at 10,940. 1argued in that article:

Such an activist use of a clear statement rule is contrary to the spirit of Chevron,
which recognized that administrative agencies were better placed than courts to make

political decisions arising in the implementation of statutes. The Court should not be
devising rules of construction that enable courts to declare particularized implementation decisions unlawful because they were not authorized in sufficiently clear terms.
Such rules effectively limit the scope of Chevron deference.
Id. In this respect, the default rule defined by Justice Souter in Mead does not seem as objectionable as SWANCC's clear statement rule, because Justice Souter would be expected to
consider evidence of legislative intent beyond the statute's text in deciding whether Congress intended Chevron deference to apply.
36. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
37. Id. at471 (footnote omitted).
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be a clear one."3 In the Court's colorful view, "Congress... does not alter
the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes."'3 9
Later, the Court again declined to conclude the CAA's language was ambiguous in determining whether EPA had authority to consider costs: "we
find it implausible that Congress would give to the EPA through these
modest words the power to determine whether implementation costs should
moderate national air quality standards." 40 In the Court's view, Congress

could be understood to have delegated in the CAA particular aspects of
administrative discretion to the EPA only if there had been an explicit and
clear delegation, rather than statutory ambiguity. This more exacting de-

fault rule, of course, turned on the Court's own view that, in the particular
statutory context, Congress can be expected to have spoken clearly to accomplish the delegation.
Notably, Justice Breyer disagreed with this aspect of the Court's deci-

sion. He rejected the Court's use of presumptions in giving a clear meaning to the statutory text and urged instead that, in the absence of a statute
barring an agency's consideration of costs, the agency should have discretion to consider costs in implementing the statute:
In order better to achieve regulatory goals-for example, to allocate resources so that
they save more lives or produce a cleaner environment-regulators must often take
account of all of a proposed regulation's adverse effects, at least where those adverse
effects clearly threaten serious and disproportionate public harm. Hence, I believe
that, other things being equal, we should read silences or ambiguities in the language
of regulatory statutes as permitting, not forbidding, this type of rational regulation.

38. Id. at 468 (citation omitted).
39. Id. (citing MCI Telecomms., 512 U.S. at 231, and Brown & Williamson Tobacco,
Corp., 529 U.S. at 159-60). The Court, of course, decides itself whether an elephant is present and whether a mousehole is its hiding place.
40. Id. (citation omitted). The Court continued to express its opinion that only clearly
stated text, rather than an ambiguous one, could be read as a delegation to EPA of discretion
to consider costs:
Even if we were to concede those premises, we still would not conclude that one of
the unenumerated factors that the agency can consider in developing and applying the
criteria is cost of implementation. That factor is both so indirectly related to public
health and so full of potential for canceling the conclusions drawn from direct health
effects that it would surely have been expressly mentioned in §§ 108 and 109 had
Congress meant it to be considered. Yet while those provisions describe in detail
how the health effects of pollutants in the ambient air are to be calculated and given
effect, see § 108(a)(2), they say not a word about costs.
Id. at 469
41. Id. at 490 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Justice Breyer, however, considered the CAA's "legislative history and
alternative sources of statutory flexibility" and, relying on these additional
indicia of expressed congressional intent, came to the same conclusion as
the majority-that, in enacting the CAA, Congress clearly intended to bar
the EPA from considering costs in defining the NAAQS. 42 Under Justice
Breyer's approach, the agency would have the decisionmaking authority
regarding the consideration of the costs of regulations when there was no
clear evidence of congressional intent to bar its consideration of that factor.
In sum, through its application of rules of interpretation, the U.S. Supreme Court has placed important limitations on the domain of statutory
ambiguity. Mead takes that same approach and thereby limits the scope of
application of the Chevron doctrine.
CONCLUSION

To be sure, Mead is important for the limits that it imposes on the applicability of Chevron deference. The case is also important because it continues the provocative use by the Rehnquist Court of an interpretive regime
imputing a clear intent to Congress, and identifies a meaning of the statute
with a limited consideration of the agency's expert and political interpretation.

42. See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 490-96 (finding economic costs cannot be used by
the EPA in setting air quality standards).

